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The struggle against the enlarged public debt has finally ended with widespread rise 
of mandatory tax rates across the European countries and worldwide. Surprisingly, 
the Republic of Macedonia (RM) has managed to preserve its tax policy relatively 
unaffected, despite the negative trends - but only temporarily. Recent announcements 
made by the new government to raise the tax rates in near future echoed very 
unpleasantly across the business community, declaring the ending, in that context, of 
the era of low tax rates. The work in this paper is intended to measure the level of tax 
burden at the shareholder level in Macedonia over the period from 2006 to 2017, which 
is known as the “golden period” of low tax rates. Relevant measurements used for the 
purpose of this research are: the cost of capital, the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) 
and the effective average tax rate (EATR). The applied measurements are 
correspondent to the fundamental methodology according to the Devereux-Griffith 
approach, recommended by the EU Commission. This analysis and its result are 
complementary to our previous findings about the effective tax rates at corporate 
level. Hopefully, they will reconfirm and extend the general picture of the RM as one of 
the most tax favorable country for investment in Europe…..so far.  
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1. Introduction 
Recently, we have determined that Republic of Macedonia has the lowest effective tax rates 
at corporate level in addition to all EU countries, and as a result, the country is set to be one 
of the most favorable investment locations in EU. This is a product of continuous reforms 
reaching their pick in the period 2006 to 2012. For example, the CIT rate at the beginning of 
the independence was established at 30% and it was in force until the end of 1995. In the 
period 1996-2006 the rate was lowered at 15%. Then, the concept of flat tax rate (corporate 
and personal income tax base) was introduced in 2007 when a tax rate of 12% was 
implemented in January, in 2008 the rate was additionally reduced at 10% and in 2009 a split 
corporate income tax rate was ultimately implemented [1].  The purpose of the CIT reform 
was to develop a consumption-based corporate income and personal income tax, influenced 
by the chronic deficit of capital needed for support of the economic growth and development 
in future.   
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The goal of this research is to measure the possible effects on investment from the 
shareholders point of view, as a result of the legislative rules implemented in the observed 
period from 2006 to 2017. The proposed methodology applied in this work is based on the 
Devereux-Griffith approach (1999), as recommended by the EU Commission. Relevant 
measurements include: the cost of the capital, the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and the 
effective average tax rate (EATR) at shareholder level, which means that the effect from the 
personal taxes must be integrated in the analysis together with the effects from the corporate 
taxes. For that purpose, the effective tax rates will be calculated on 3 (three) levels: zero-rate 
shareholder level, top-rate shareholder level with no qualified or substantial participation and 
top-rate shareholder level with qualified participation according to the national tax provisions. 
Following the introduction, the article firstly elaborates about the inevitable integration 
between the CIT and PIT in the process of corporate taxation. After that, the paper contains 
short presentation of the proposed methodology and the derived parameters in the case of 
Macedonia, finishing with full analysis of the calculated effective tax rates at shareholder 
level. Hopefully, the analysis will support the thesis that Macedonia has really improved the 
investment environment over the last decade.  
 
2. Integration between the corporate and personal income tax 
Our first series of calculations were conducted only from the view of the corporation, and as 
a result we managed to present the estimates of effective tax rates only at corporate level. 
This approach in the calculation requires total abstraction from the effect of all personal 
taxes. But, corporate taxation is very complicated matter and vary much often depends on 
the cross-effects from the personal taxation. The reason for that lies in the fact that the 
corporate tax base (i.e. the corporate income) cannot be limited only at the corporation 
observed as a form of a legal entity. Usually, after the initial taxation at corporate level, 
corporate profits are distributed to the shareholders in a form of dividends, capital gains or 
interest payments, and are subject to additional taxation at personal level.  
Firstly we would like to notice that the process of taxation of corporate profit on itself, might 
result with some interesting effects emerging from its nature. One of them is the privileged 
treatment of debt as a source of finance, as a result of the usual and widely excepted 
treatment of interest expenses. Normally, since interest payments are in fact tax deductible 
from the corporate income tax base, debt source of finance is considered as tax preferred 
compared to the equity source of finance. This is the reason why, it is thought for the CIT, 
actually to be considered as a tax on the return on equity. The last triggers unfavorable 
behavior of the corporation, to use more borrowed capital, thus increasing the risk of 
bankruptcy and insolvency of the firm. Similarly, retained earnings are more preferred to new 
equity issues since capital gains are usually taxed upon realization or eventually exempted 
from taxation when reinvested. This commonly creates better position for the old mature 
companies as they possess more abundant accumulated reserves, on the contrary to the 
young emerging enterprises.  
There is some solid evidence that the integration of CIT and PIT could relieve the corporate 
tax differences, as well, and produce a higher neutrality between debt and equity as opposite 
to the previous examples. According to the OECD [2], [3], [4], [5], the following tax systems 
are considered as neutral with certain capacity to eliminate the difference between debt and 
equity: the full integration tax system (FIT), the dual income tax system (DIT), the allowance 
for corporate equity tax system (ACE), the allowance for shareholder equity tax system 
(ASE), the comprehensive business income tax (CBIT) etc. For example, the FIT system 
treats the corporation as a pass through entity and allocates all the corporate profit at 
shareholder level, where it is subject to personal income tax. For the CIT already paid on 
distributed profits, the stockholders will be granted with a tax credit in amount of the gross 
dividends received from the corporation. As a result, tax treatment between debt and equity 
will be ultimately equalized. Another great example is the CBIT system. This regime 
successfully eliminates the need for integration between the corporate and personal taxes on 
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equity by creating restrictions on the possibilities for deduction of the interest expenses. In 
fact, interest expenses are no longer deductible from the corporate income tax base and at 
the same time are exempt from taxation at personal level. The result is neutrality and 
indifference between debt and equity. Similar effects are determined within the other tax 
systems mentioned above.. 
According to Devereux & Griffith: “There are a variety of approaches that countries have 
adopted to try and alleviate this “double” taxation through the integration of the personal and 
corporate income tax systems” [6]. They are summarized in 3 (three) different categories: 
imputation systems, classical systems and split rate system. Essentially, the purpose of the 
imputation tax system is to effectively offset a portion (partly integrated tax system) or the 
entire corporate income tax (fully integrated tax system) levied on distributed profits against 
the shareholders tax liability. This could be realized in a form of tax credit of alternatively, in a 
form of tax exemption. Under the classical tax system, distributed profits are taxed at 
corporate level and again at personal level, which means that there are no tax reliefs 
available. The third option is the split rate system, which implements two different (split) 
mandatory tax rates, one to distributed earnings, and the other to retained earnings. Usually, 
there are 2 (two) known different strategies concerning the split rate system. First, is the 
strategy to apply a lower rate on distributed profits which will serve to compensate for the 
personal tax paid on dividend income. This approach in the policy might restore neutrality 
between debt and external equity. The other strategy is to levy a lower split rate on retained 
accumulated earnings instead on distributed profits. The aim of this strategy is to generate 
incentives for reinvestment of retentions, and therefore, reduce the chances for their 
consumption in a form of dividend distributions. It is very common to the countries with 
consumption-based CIT systems, for example, such as Estonia and Macedonia, as it 
stimulates savings and investment in corporations. Across the system’s ability to equalize the 
treatment of debt and retained earnings, this strategy will additionally create preferences to 
retentions over external equity.  
According to Cnossen [7], the integration of corporate income tax and personal income tax 
could be found at the dividend relief system (alternatively, the dividend deduction system), 
which can take 2 (two) forms: the dividend relief system at shareholder level; and the 
dividend relief system at corporate level. The first one resembles to the imputation tax 
system, and it’s designed for reduction of the burden on equity-financed investment for the 
resident shareholders. The second concept permits partial or full deduction of the gross 
dividends paid from taxable corporate profits (the corporate tax base). This will have strong 
impact on the foreign investors as it leaves them to escape from taxation in the source 
country. As a result, foreign investors benefit from the dividend relief system at corporate 
level, ultimately inducing foreign investment in the host country [8]. 
As we can see from the text presented above, the integration between corporate and 
personal taxation might take different forms and different concepts concerning the different 
policy goals. From this perspective, tax authorities in the Republic of Macedonia have made 
great efforts to restructure and redesign the CIT system and produced some simple, 
interesting, and above all, brave solutions, for example, such as the concept of flat tax rates 
in direct taxing, and the split tax rate system. In addition we calculate the impact of the 
implemented measures on the effective tax rates at shareholder level, as they have the right 
properties for evaluation of the integrated effect from corporate and personal taxation. 
3. Implementation of the relevant methodology in the case of 
Macedonia  
We should notice again, that the calculation of the effective tax rates  in this article considers 
the taxes at shareholder’s level, meaning that all personal tax rates are included in the 
process. The assumptions built in the methodology chosen for the purpose of calculation, are 
presented in Table 1 from below. On the other hand, Table 2, integrates all the elements of 
the Macedonian corporate income and personal income tax code essential for determination 
of the effective tax rates. 
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Table 1: Assumed economic parameters 
Parameters: Symbol Value 
True economic depreciation rate 
- industrial buildings 
- equipment (machinery) 
- intangibles 
- financial assets 
- inventories 
δ  
3,1%  
17,5%  
15,35%  
0%  
0%  
Real interest rate r 5%  
Inflation rate π 2%  
Pre-tax rate of return p 20%  
Source: Devereux & Griffith (2002) 
 
Table 2: Tax code parameters   
Relevant domestic tax parameters: Symbol Value 
Capital allowances (straight-line method): 
- industrial buildings (L=20 years) 
- equipment (machinery) (L=7 years) 
- intangibles (L=5 years) 
- financial assets (L=0 years) 
- inventories (L=0 years) 
φ  
5%  
14,28%  
20%  
0%  
0%  
Treatment of inventories (average cost method) ν 0,5 
Treatment of financial assets  ν 1 
Corporate tax rate (2006, 2007, 2008, 2009-2017) t 15%, 12%, 10%, 0% 
Split corporate tax rate on distributions (2009-2017) td 10% 
Personal tax rates (zero-rate shareholder level): 
- on interest income (2006-2017) 
- on dividend income (2006, 2007, 2008-2017) 
- on capital gains (2006, 2007, 2008-2012, 2013-2017) 
 
mi 
md 
z* 
 
0% 
0%, 12%, 10% 
10,5%, 8,4%, 7%, 0% 
Personal tax rates (top-rate shareholder level nonqualif.): 
- on interest income (2006-2017) 
- on dividend income (2006, 2007, 2008-2017) 
- on capital gains (2006, 2007, 2008-2012, 2013-2017) 
 
mi 
md 
z* 
 
0% 
7,5%, 12%, 10% 
10,5%, 8,4%, 7%, 0% 
Personal tax rates (top-rate shareholder level qualified): 
- on interest income (2006-2017) 
- on dividend income (2006, 2007, 2008-2017) 
- on capital gains (2006, 2007, 2008-2017, 2013-2017) 
 
mi 
md 
z* 
 
0% 
7,5%, 12%, 10% 
10,5%, 8,4%, 7%, 0% 
Proportion of  accruals-equivalent capital gains income  λ 10% 
Imputation tax credit rate on dividends paid (2006-2017) c 0% 
Real estate tax rate (property tax rate) e 0,1% 
Source: CIT code and Nomenclature of depreciation (2006-2017) 
 
First, little explanation of the undergoing tax reform and the tax code parameters presented 
above. 
Symbol t, represents the nominal (statutory) corporate income tax rate and e the real 
estate tax rate, both payable in the period in which the investment is undertaken. The CIT 
rate at the beginning of the observed period was established at 15% in 2006. Then, a rate of 
12% was implemented in January 2007, in 2008 the rate was additionally reduced at 10% 
and in 2009 a split corporate income tax rate was ultimately implemented. The purpose of 
the CIT reform was to develop a consumption-based corporate tax system, influenced by the 
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chronic deficit of capital which needed to support the economic growth and investment.1 The 
real estate tax rate (or the property tax rate) in Macedonia, is usually applied for the legal 
entities only in case of acquiring building structures with a rate of 0,1%.  
The data for the personal income tax rates show that the tax rate on interest income mi 
was 0 during the whole period. Mandatory capital gains tax rates were 15% in 2006, 12% in 
2007 and 10% in the period 2008 to 2012. During the time, a deduction of 30% was allowed 
on the capital income tax base, resulting with effective mandatory rates of 10,5% in 2006, 
8,4% in 2007 and 7% in the period 2008-2012. In 2013, the rate was abolished (z* = 0). The 
proportion of accruals-equivalent capital gains income λ assumes constant value of 10% 
(0,1), meaning that corporate shares have a mean holding period of ten years [9]. In 
Macedonia, the statutory personal tax rate on dividend income md was 15% in 2006. After 
that, the rate was established at 12% in 2007 and at 10% in the period 2008 to 2017. From 
1996 up until 2006, the imputation corporate tax system was in force allowing a tax credit 
or alternatively, an imputation rate on dividend distributions in amount of 50% from the 
personal income tax liability. Considering that the adequate mandatory liability rate was 15% 
in 2006, this produced value for c of 0,075 (0,15 * 0,50 = 0,075). 
Next, the methodology of Devereux and Griffith [10] is explained additionally. 
In order to develop an effective average tax rate, Devereux and Griffith had to scale the 
difference in the net present value of the project in the presence and absence of tax by the 
net present value of the economic rent .This means that the EATR is defined as an 
expression of the level of tax burden for a different level of profitability. We’ve seen that in 
absence of personal taxes EATR is defined as: 
 
(1) 
)1/(
*
rp
RR
EATR


 ; 
 
but in presence of the personal taxes, as it is important for this research, EATR could be 
measured through the expression: 
 
(2) 
)1/(
)1(*
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RzR
EATR


 ; 
 
where we already know that: p – assumed pre-tax real rate of return, r - real rate of return 
and R* - economic rent of the project in abcense of tax, measured as: 
 
(3) 
r
rp
R



1
*
; 
 
The new term in the equation is z, which is known as the effective personal capital gains tax 
rate or with other words, accruals-equivalent capital gains tax rate is defined as: 
 
(4) 
im
z
z
i )1(
*




; 
 
This expression explains that the value of effective capital gains tax rate depends from the 
personal tax rate on interest income mi, which in the case of Macedonia is always zero, the 
statutory capital gains tax rate z* and the proportion of accruals-equivalent capital gains 
                                                             
1 Consumption-based tax models assume that the tax burden of corporate income is generally 
targeted to its shares that are intended for consumption. The corporate income intended to be saved 
or reinvested is targeted basically with lower tax rates or exempted from taxation. 
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income λ. Symbol i represents the nominal interest rate found from the expression: i = (1 + 
r)(1 + π) - 1, and yields value of 0,071 or 7,1%. 
Term R from equation (2), is known as the economic rent of the project in presence of tax: 
 
(5) 
DENE FFeAttpR 
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where the new symbols are: δ - true economic depreciation rate, π - inflation rate, t - nominal 
corporate income tax rate, and e - real estate tax rate, the last both payable in the period in 
which the investment is undertaken. In the previous article we mentioned that the real estate 
tax rate (or the property tax rate) in RM, is usually applied only in case of investment in 
buildings with a rate of 0,1%.  
In case of calculation of EATR at shareholder level, personal taxes are relevant for the 
shareholder’s discount rate ρ defined as: 
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Tax discrimination variable γ, from expression (7), as already shown, is used to measure tax 
discrimination between new equity and distributions. If we define the new terms: md - 
personal tax rate on dividend income, z and c - tax credit rate allowed for dividends paid, 
then we may write for γ: 
 
 (7) 
)1)(1(
)1(
cz
md


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In Macedonia, the statutory personal tax rate on dividend income md was 15% in 2006, but 
since a 50% deduction was allowed, the effective mandatory rate was established at 7,5%. 
This rate was relevant in 2006 only for the top-rate shareholders with nonqualified and 
qualified participation. For the zero-rate shareholder the rate was 0%. After that, the rate was 
established at 12% in 2007 and at 10% in the period 2008 to 2012, without any differences 
between the shareholders. Values for z are derived from equation (4), while for c they are 
always zero, since there is no available imputation tax credit rate on dividends paid. In order 
to integrate the impact of the established split corporate rates in 2009, since retained profits 
are not taxed (t = 0) and corporate profits are taxed only upon distribution with a 10% tax rate 
(td=0,1), the tax discrimination variable from the relevant year are additionally altered as: 
 
(8) 
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)1(
)1(

t
t d


 ; 
 
Just to recall for the terms νtπ and A from equation (5). Essentially, the first one reflects the 
cases of taxation of inventories and financial assets and its value depends from the method 
of valuation for tax purposes. In the RM, the treatment of financial assets implies that ν = 1, 
while the treatment of inventories requires value of 0,5. The second parameter A represents 
the net present value of tax depreciation allowances for the different assets. In the RM, tax 
depreciation rate for the buildings is 5%, for the equipment (machinery) 14,28% and for the 
intangibles 20%, measured as an equally weighted average rates in each asset group 
(equivalently, the lengths of depreciation periods are 20, 7 and 5, consequently).  For the 
financial assets and inventories, the tax depreciation rates are 0. The NPV of tax 
depreciation allowances for the straight-line depreciation method, is measured as: 
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where L is the length of the depreciation period (expressed in years) and φ is the 
depreciation rate for the different assets allowed for tax purposes.  
The financial constraints of investment depend largely on the source of finance, according to 
Devereux & Griffith [11]. In the case of reinvestment of retained earnings, this variable 
always generate value of zero (FRE=0). When there is a case of new equity finance, the 
financial constraints variable FNE is expressed as:  
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and in the case of debt finance investment, the variable FDE is measured as: 
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Finally, the effective marginal tax rate is recognized as in its most familiar from of: 
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p
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where p~ is the cost of capital (pre-tax rate of return on investment) established as: 
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while s represents the post-tax rate of return on savings: 
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Table 3 from below, summarizes the derived input parameters used for calculation of the 
effective tax rates in the observed period 2006-2012. 
 
Table 3 Derived input parameters, 2006-2012 
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Parameter Symbol 2006 2007 2008 2009/2012 2013/2017 
Economic rent in absence of 
tax 
R* 0,1429 0,1429 0,1429 0,1429 0,1429 
Nominal interest rate i 0,071 0,071 0,071 0,071 0,071 
Post-tax rate of return s 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 0,05 
Shareholder’s discount rate ρ 0,0756 0,0746 0,0740 0,0740 0,0740 
Effective capital gains tax rate z 0,0614 0,0491 0,0409 0,0409 0,00 
Tax discrimination variable  γ 1,0654 0,9254 0,9384 0,8445 0,8445 
Financial constraints variable 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
F 
FRE 
FNE 
FDE 
 
0 
0,00460 
0,01512 
 
0 
-0,00518 
0,01044 
 
0 
-0,00425 
0,00883 
 
0 
-0,01072 
0,00236 
 
0 
-0,01072 
0,00236 
Allowances  
- buildings 
- equipment (machinery) 
- intangibles  
- financial assets 
- inventories 
A 
Abui 
Aequ 
Aint 
Afin 
Ainv 
 
0,0761 
0,1132 
0,1212 
0 
0 
 
0,0614 
0,0909 
0,0972 
0 
0 
 
0,0514 
0,0759 
0,0811 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
 
4. The basic tax parameters at shareholder level 
 
These measurements include the cost of capital, EMTR and EATR. The European 
Commission insists that the relevant parameters from the official Devereux and Griffith 
methodology should be expressed at 3 levels: at zero-rate shareholder level, top-rate 
qualified and top-rate non-qualified shareholder level. This need is adapted to the taxing 
practices of the majority European countries. In the Republic of Macedonia, since the 
implementation of the “flat” tax system in 2006, the things are very much simplified since the 
brackets of the personal income tax are effectively diminished and the new code didn’t   
recognize any differences between these 3 categories of shareholders. Except for the year of 
2006, when the tax rate of dividend income was 0% for the small “zero” rate-shareholders, 
ever since the domestic tax system implies only a single rate for the distributions of capital 
income. This means that the taxing regime for these 3 categories of shareholders are 
equalized in the period after the year of 2006, producing identical tax rates for the zero-rate, 
top-rate qualified and the top-rate non-qualified shareholder.  
 
Table 4: The Cost of capital at shareholder level, 2006-2017 (%) 
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Shareholder Zero--rate  Top-rate (qual. & nonqual.)  
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009/
2012 
2013/ 
2017 
2006 2007 2008 2009/
2012 
2013/
2017 
Buildings (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
5,55 
6,32 
5,78 
4,56 
5,81 
6,04 
6,70 
4,68 
5,67 
5,86 
6,39 
4,76 
5,74 
5,40 
6,73 
5,10 
5,64 
5,10 
6,73 
5,10 
5,78 
6,32 
6,45 
4,56 
5,81 
6,04 
6,70 
4,68 
5,67 
5,86 
6,39 
4,76 
5,74 
5,40 
6,73 
5,10 
5,64 
5,10 
6,73 
5,10 
Equipment (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
5,68 
6,44 
5,91 
4,68 
5,88 
6,11 
6,78 
4,76 
5,71 
5,90 
6,43 
4,80 
5,64 
5,29 
6,63 
5,00 
5,54 
5,00 
6,63 
5,00 
5,90 
6,44 
6,57 
4,68 
5,88 
6,11 
6,78 
4,76 
5,71 
5,90 
6,43 
4,80 
5,64 
5,29 
6,63 
5,00 
5,54 
5,00 
6,63 
5,00 
Intangibles (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
5,39 
6,16 
5,62 
4,39 
5,66 
5,89 
6,56 
4,54 
5,54 
5,73 
6,26 
4,63 
5,64 
5,29 
6,63 
5,00 
5,54 
5,00 
6,63 
5,00 
5,61 
6,16 
6,28 
4,39 
5,66 
5,89 
6,56 
4,54 
5,54 
5,73 
6,26 
4,63 
5,64 
5,29 
6,63 
5,00 
5,54 
5,00 
6,63 
5,00 
Financial assets (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
5,99 
6,76 
6,22 
5,00 
6,12 
6,35 
7,02 
5,00 
5,91 
6,10 
6,63 
5,00 
5,64 
5,29 
6,63 
5,00 
5,54 
5,00 
6,63 
5,00 
6,21 
6,76 
6,88 
5,00 
6,12 
6,35 
7,02 
5,00 
5,91 
6,10 
6,63 
5,00 
5,64 
5,29 
6,63 
5,00 
5,54 
5,00 
6,63 
5,00 
Inventories (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
5,82 
6,58 
6,05 
4,82 
5,97 
6,22 
6,88 
4,86 
5,80 
6,00 
6,52 
4,89 
5,64 
5,29 
6,63 
5,00 
5,54 
5,00 
6,63 
5,00 
6,04 
6,58 
6,71 
4,82 
5,97 
6,22 
6,88 
4,86 
5,80 
6,00 
6,52 
4,89 
5,64 
5,29 
6,63 
5,00 
5,54 
5,00 
6,63 
5,00 
Retained earnings (mean) 6,45 6,12 5,92 5,31 5,02 6,45 6,12 5,92 5,31 5,02 
New equity issue (mean) 5,92 6,79 6,45 6,65 6,65 6,58 6,79 6,45 6,65 6,65 
Debt (mean) 4,69 4,77 4,82 5,02 5,02 4,69 4,77 4,82 5,02 5,02 
Overal mean 5,69 5,89 5,73 5,66 5,56 5,91 5,89 5,73 5,66 5,56 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Table 4 shows the estimated values of the cost of capital in Macedonia in the period 2006-
2017. Technically speaking, these are the relevant discount rates used for calculation of the 
effective tax rates. The results indicate that in the most cases when the investments are 
financed with retained earnings and new equity issue, the cost of capital is higher or equal to 
5%, which is the level of the assumed real rate of return (the opportunity cost of the 
investment). Retained earnings demonstrated highest value of 6,45% in 2006 (even higher 
than new equity issues which measured 5,92% for the zero-rate shareholder), while the 
lowest of only 5,02% in the period 2013 to 2017. This is direct consequence of the 
implementation of the rule from the same period that abolished the tax rate on capital gains 
income. As a result, in the observed time horizon the sources of finance such as debt and 
capital gains were effectively equalized. In the case of investment financed with external 
debt, the values are mostly lower than the real rate of return, ranging from 4,69% to 5,02%. 
As a general rule, this means that the domestic tax system subsidizes investment financed 
with debt compared to the other types of investments. The third financial alternative, external 
equity or new equity issues, generates the highest values of the cost of capital in average 
terms, with the highest absolute value of 6,79% in 2007. On the other hand, the analysis of 
the cost of capital on investments by type of asset, points that the investments in intangibles 
and buildings have the lowest minimum rate of return. Investments in inventories and 
especially in financial assets represents the group of assets with the opposite conclusion.  
 
Table 6: EMTR at shareholder level in Macedonia, 2006-2017 (%) 
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Shareholder Zero-rate  Top-rate (qual. & nonqual.)  
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009 
/2012 
2013 
/2017 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
/2012 
2013 
/2017 
Buildings (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
8,24 
20,88 
13,49 
-9,65 
11,92 
17,22 
25,37 
-6,84 
10,46 
14,67 
21,75 
-5,04 
11,69 
7,41 
25,71 
1,96 
9,87 
1,96 
25,71 
1,96 
11,24 
20,88 
22,48 
-9,65 
11,92 
17,22 
25,37 
-6,84 
10,46 
14,67 
21,75 
-5,04 
11,69 
7,41 
25,71 
1,96 
9,87 
1,96 
25,71 
1,96 
Equipment (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
10,30 
22,36 
15,39 
-6,84 
13,13 
18,17 
26,25 
-5,04 
11,11 
15,25 
22,24 
-4,16 
10,02 
5,48 
24,58 
0,00 
8,19 
0,00 
24,58 
0,00 
13,14 
22,36 
23,90 
-6,84 
13,13 
18,17 
26,25 
-5,04 
11,11 
15,25 
22,24 
-4,16 
10,02 
5,48 
24,58 
0,00 
8,19 
0,00 
24,58 
0,00 
Intangibles (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
5,32 
18,83 
11,03 
-13,89 
9,59 
15,11 
23,78 
-10,13 
8,29 
12,74 
20,13 
-7,99 
10,02 
5,48 
24,58 
0,00 
8,19 
0,00 
24,58 
0,00 
8,44 
18,83 
20,38 
-13,89 
9,59 
15,11 
23,78 
-10,1 
8,29 
12,74 
20,13 
-7,99 
10,02 
5,48 
24,58 
0,00 
8,19 
0,00 
24,58 
0,00 
Financial assets (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
15,21 
26,03 
19,61 
0,00 
16,68 
21,26 
28,77 
0,00 
14,20 
18,03 
24,58 
0,00 
10,02 
5,48 
24,58 
0,00 
8,19 
0,00 
24,58 
0,00 
17,79 
26,03 
27,33 
0,00 
16,68 
21,26 
28,77 
0,00 
14,20 
18,03 
24,58 
0,00 
10,02 
5,48 
24,58 
0,00 
8,19 
0,00 
24,58 
0,00 
Inventories (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
12,54 
24,01 
17,35 
-3,73 
14,69 
19,61 
27,33 
-2,88 
12,58 
16,67 
23,31 
-2,24 
10,02 
5,48 
24,58 
0,00 
8,19 
0,00 
24,58 
0,00 
15,25 
24,01 
25,48 
-3,73 
14,69 
19,61 
27,33 
-2,88 
12,58 
16,67 
23,31 
-2,24 
10,02 
5,48 
24,58 
0,00 
8,19 
0,00 
24,58 
0,00 
Retained earnings (mean) 22,42 18,27 15,47 5,87 0,39 22,42 18,27 15,47 5,87 0,39 
New equity issue (mean) 15,37 26,30 22,40 24,81 24,81 23,91 26,30 22,40 24,81 24,81 
Debt (mean) -6,82 -4,98 -3,89 0,39 0,39 -6,82 -4,98 -3,89 0,39 0,39 
Overal mean 10,32 13,17 11,32 10,35 8,53 13,17 13,17 11,32 10,35 8,53 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Estimated values of the effective marginal tax rates are presented in Table 5. These 
measurements express the allocation efficiency of tax system through the incorporation of 
the available tax incentives built in the system. Concerning the results of EMTR, we can 
generalize similar paths as in the previous case of the cost of capital. Basically, investments 
with retained earnings generate positive values of EMTR, the highest of 22,42% in 2006, and 
the lowest of only 0,39% from 2013 to 2017. Positive values of EMTR indicate that the cost 
of capital for these investments is higher than the real rate of return, meaning that in these 
cases there is a positive taxation on the marginal unit of investment. The same conclusion is 
relevant for the equity issues also, the smallest value of 15,37% for the zero-rate shareholder  
is in 2006, while the highest regardless the shareholder category is in 2007 with 26,30%. On 
the contrary, EMTR on investments covered with external debt shows  negative values in the 
period from 2006 to 2008, with the highest negative value of -6,82% registered in 2006. After 
that, a small positive value of 0,39% is measured in the period 2009 to 2017. The negative 
prefix in the first period indicates on the existence of positive incentives that resulted in 
values of the cost of capital lower than 5%, automatically subsidizing the marginal investment 
financed with debt. Positive results from the second period demonstrate restriction of 
favorability of the tax system concerning to the debt type of investment. 
Table 6 presents the estimated values of EATRs on investments in Macedonia calculated 
with assumed pre-tax real rate of return of 20%. The analytical value of the EATR arises from 
its ability to indicate to the part of the corporate income that is being effectively cut by 
taxation, but, unlike EMTR, the EATR indicates on the effective reduction of the net-present 
value of a profitable, infra-marginal investment. It is an instrument that enables generation of 
right decision among the different location specific discrete investment choices. The results 
of the EATR by source of finance explicit generous treatment for the zero-rate shareholder in 
2006 across all the categories of finance (the lowest absolute EATRs are registered here 
with 17,69%, 15,42% and 10,24% successively). The situation with the qualified and non-
qualified shareholder is similar once again. Namely, the investments financed with retained 
earnings and equity issue have the highest values of EATR. Precisely, EATR on investment 
financed with retained earnings range from 21,99% in 2006 to 14,52% in 2013-2017, while 
EATR on investment financed with new equity issue vary from 24,04% in 2007 to 20,28% in 
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2008. Investments financed with debt, yet again demonstrate the lowest values ranging from 
13,70% in 2008 to 16,25% in 2007. As a conclusion, the implementation of the split rate tax 
system resulted with lower tax burden on investments with retained earnings (since retained 
profits are exempt from taxation) and higher burden on investments covered with equity 
issues (since distributions of profits are taxed). It is also evident that in the last period from 
2013 to 2017, there is no difference in the tax treatment between debt and retained earning 
as a result of the implemented zero tax rate on capital gains.  
 
Table 6: EATR at shareholder level in Macedonia, 2006-2017 (%) 
Shareholder Zero-rate  Top-rate (qual. & nonqual.)  
Year  2006 2007 2008 2009/
12 
2013 
/17 
2006 2007 2008 2009 
/12 
2013 
/17 
Buildings (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
13,88 
17,12 
14,85 
9,67 
20,26 
21,13 
23,72 
15,92 
17,16 
17,93 
20,07 
13,48 
17,45 
16,05 
21,45 
14,86 
17,05 
14,86 
21,45 
14,86 
19,34 
21,46 
21,97 
14,58 
20,26 
21,13 
23,72 
15,92 
17,16 
17,93 
20,07 
13,48 
17,45 
16,05 
21,45 
14,86 
17,05 
14,86 
21,45 
14,86 
Equipment (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
14,41 
17,65 
15,39 
10,20 
20,54 
21,41 
24,00 
16,20 
17,32 
18,09 
20,23 
13,65 
17,03 
15,63 
21,03 
14,44 
16,64 
14,44 
21,03 
14,44 
19,83 
21,96 
22,46 
15,07 
20,54 
21,41 
24,00 
16,20 
17,32 
18,09 
20,23 
13,65 
17,03 
15,63 
21,03 
14,44 
16,64 
14,44 
21,03 
14,44 
Intangibles (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
13,19 
16,43 
14,17 
8,98 
19,69 
20,56 
23,15 
15,35 
16,61 
17,37 
19,52 
12,93 
17,03 
15,63 
21,03 
14,44 
16,64 
14,44 
21,03 
14,44 
18,70 
20,83 
21,33 
13,94 
19,69 
20,56 
23,15 
15,35 
16,61 
17,37 
19,52 
12,93 
17,03 
15,63 
21,03 
14,44 
16,64 
14,44 
21,03 
14,44 
Financial assets (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
15,75 
18,98 
16,72 
11,54 
21,47 
22,34 
24,93 
17,14 
18,11 
18,88 
21,02 
14,42 
17,03 
15,63 
21,03 
14,44 
16,64 
14,44 
21,03 
14,44 
21,06 
23,19 
23,70 
16,30 
21,47 
22,34 
24,93 
17,14 
18,11 
18,88 
21,02 
14,42 
17,03 
15,63 
21,03 
14,44 
16,64 
14,44 
21,03 
14,44 
Inventories (mean) 
- retained earnings 
- new equity issue 
- debt 
15,01 
18,25 
15,99 
10,80 
20,96 
21,83 
24,42 
16,62 
17,67 
18,44 
20,58 
14,00 
17,03 
15,63 
21,03 
14,44 
16,64 
14,44 
21,03 
14,44 
20,38 
22,51 
23,01 
15,63 
20,96 
21,83 
24,42 
16,62 
17,67 
18,44 
20,58 
14,00 
17,03 
15,63 
21,03 
14,44 
16,64 
14,44 
21,03 
14,44 
Retained earnings (mean) 17,69 21,45 18,14 15,71 14,52 21,99 21,45 18,14 15,71 14,52 
New equity issue (mean) 15,42 24,04 20,28 21,11 21,11 22,49 24,04 20,28 21,11 21,11 
Debt (mean) 10,24 16,25 13,70 14,52 14,52 15,10 16,25 13,70 14,52 14,52 
Overall mean 14,45 20,58 17,37 17,14 16,71 19,86 20,58 17,37 17,14 16,71 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Next, we pay attention on the overall tax burden parameters in the observed period and 
their trends. First, about the tax parameters at zero-rate shareholder level, which we said, 
differ from the others only at the beginning of the observed period in 2006. Calculations from 
Table 4, 5 and 6 show that the overall mean value of the cost of capital, EMTR and EATR at 
zero-rate shareholder level in 2006 are significantly lower than the same parameters at the 
top-rate qualified and non-qualified shareholder level in the same year (5,69%, 10,32% and 
14,45% versus 5,91%, 13,17% and 19,86%). For the rest of the analyzed period, their values 
are identical since the different shareholder categories were erased within the tax code. So, 
in 2007 the  overall mean for the cost of capital was at its peak with 5,86%, after it started to 
decline to its bottom value in 2013-2017 at 5,56%. The same trend is obvious for the overall 
mean EMTR and EATR as they reached their largest values in 2007 (13,17% and 20,58%) 
while their smallest are registered in period 20013-2017 (8,53 and 16,71). The previous facts 
are also illustrated in Graphic 1 and Graphic 2 which capture all the difference and 
similarities of the analyzed trend paths. 
 
Graphic 1: The relevant tax parameters at zero-rate shareholder level 
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Source: Authors illustration 
 
Graphic 2: The relevant tax parameters at top-rate qualified and non-qualified shareholder level 
 
Source: Authors illustration 
 
 
All this presentation leads us to the conclusion that the Macedonian tax system is really 
generous and favorable towards the investment over the time. The continuous trend of 
lowering compulsory rates, the implementation of the split tax rate system for reinvestment, 
the exemption of capital gains from the means of taxation and many other built-in tax benefits 
have resulted in historically lowest tax burden parameters lately. Will they remain sustainable 
in the period that follows, only the time will reveal. 
At the bottom line, we compare the EATR at shareholder level and the EATR at company’s 
level. This will determine the dimension of “double” taxation present within the domestic 
tax system. Accordingly, if there is significant difference between the relevant parameters 
compared, than this will confirm the thesis. As we can see from Table 7, in the whole period 
that difference is obvious indicating on the presence of integrated “double” taxation. Smallest 
difference is evident in 2006, when the imputation tax system was still in force, allowing a 
significant tax credit on the received dividends and resulting in smaller EATR at shareholder 
level. Then, when the flat tax system was introduced in 2007 the contrast was enlarged for 
the benefit of corporate taxes. Proportional tax rates on corporate and personal income, 
without any significant exemptions at personal level, produced almost a “double” difference 
between the compared tax parameters. This discrepancy sustained almost unchanged until 
the end of the period (17,14% vs 8,77 from 2009/2012), when the exemption of capital gains 
income in 2013 insignificantly lowered the difference against the EATR at shareholder level 
(16,71 vs 8,77).  
This is illustrated on Graphic 3 also. The level of “double” taxation is determined by the 
difference between the blue and the red line on the graphic, which as we can see is constant 
but slightly diminishing over the time.  
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Table 7: EATR at shareholder and corporate level in period 2006-2017 
 2006 2007 2008 2009/2012 2013/2017 
EATR at shareholder level 19,86 20,58 17,37 17,14 16,71 
EATR at corporate level 13,48 10,82 8,99 8,77 8,77 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
 
Graphic 3: Comparison between the EATR at shareholder level and EATR at corporate level 
 
Source: Authors illustration 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Over the last decade the Republic of Macedonia has preserved its tax policy relatively 
unchanged, despite the widespread tendencies of rising taxes across the EU countries. But 
the announcements made by the new government concerning the tax policy reflected in 
pessimistic expectations among the public. This work contains the measurements of the level 
of tax burden at the shareholder level in Macedonia over the period from 2006 to 2017. The 
relevant parameters such as the cost of capital, the effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and 
the effective average tax rate (EATR), manifest down sloping tendencies over the observed 
period, expressing the favorable conditions for investing created by the abundance of tax 
“friendly” measures. The continuous trend of lowering compulsory rates, the implementation 
of the split tax rate system for reinvestment, the exemption of capital gains from the means of 
taxation and many other built-in tax benefits have resulted in historically lowest tax burden 
parameters ever. Also, the difference in EATR at shareholder and corporate level implies on 
the presence of “double” taxation phenomenon within the channels of corporate profit. How 
will the new government react on the pressure to consolidate the public debt, and will this 
constellation of tax policy prevail further, is hidden under the veil of time.  
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